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Just days before the vote the impression given by major international print media was that 
the vote was a close-run thing, an assessment which proved to be at best optimistic. We 
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result towards the opposition and that these efforts singularly failed. The conclusions of 
our analysis are, first, that the “propaganda” model advanced by Chomsky is now 
faltering in the Americas and, second, that the region is acting in manner that is 
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If you rely on mainstream English-language media for Latin American news coverage 
then Hugo Chávez’s 7 October 2012 re-election as president may have been a shock. Just 
days before the vote Western media trumpeted the surge of opposition candidate 
Henrique Capriles Radonski, calling the contest a dead-heat with cancer-stricken Chávez 
on verge of defeat. In a sense, this was nothing new; Western media reports of Chávez’s 
Venezuela have maintained a narrative of looming economic collapse, crisis of 
governance, endemic violence, corruption, and democratic diminution. Meanwhile 
Chávez has triumphed in successive elections (Boykoff, 2009; Young, 2013). In the lead 
up to the October 2012 poll, the Western media narrative was re-energised by Capriles’ 
emergence as a credible alternative, with the consistent theme of “this time it would be 
different”. This was all wishful thinking. Despite the emergence of the first credible 
opposition candidate in fourteen years, there was never any doubt that Chávez would win. 
Rather, the question was by how much. Although the result was closer than expected, it 
was still a ringing endorsement for Chávez, who took home 55.07 per cent of the vote to 
Capriles’ 44.31 per cent. 
 
We argue that Chávez’s comfortable 2012 re-election stands as a strong indicator of the 
Western media’s limited power to influence democratic outcomes in Latin America. 
Chávez’s victory came despite continued attempts to construct and disseminate a 
narrative consonant with the tenets of Western hegemony. In demonstrating this limit, we 
first survey criticisms on the role of the media in democratic society, focusing on path-
breaking work by Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman. Here, we reveal how Western 
media has historically shifted the focus of political debate in Latin America so as to 
influence and occasionally direct electoral outcomes. We next characterise Western 
media coverage of the 2012 Venezuelan presidential election. By focusing on feature 
pieces from opinion-forming English and Spanish-language international print news 
outlets we highlight how the Western establishment sought to create a Capriles victory 
narrative and thus make it fact, providing an alternate narrative to sustain the Venezuelan 
opposition. 1  Our goal is not to contest the accuracy of the reporting, but rather 
demonstrate the consistency of narratives and how individual news stories combine to 
create a strong implicit editorial line. Drawing on William I. Robinson, we argue that this 
narrative serves as an important tool of regional U.S. hegemony promotion, creating 
“feedback loops” that reinforce the positions of transnationally-oriented “agents of 
influence” waging ideological struggles in civil society to secure consent for the U.S.-led 
neoliberal world order. The crucial lesson of the October 2012 election is that this 
feedback loop has broken down, making Western hegemony promotion a less 
straightforward prospect. In the penultimate section we explore the causes of this 
breakdown, arguing that they have local and regional aspects. Locally, the breakdown of 
the feedback loop results from the democratisation of civil society in Venezuela as a 
result of the Bolivarian Revolution. From a Gramscian perspective, this means that 
subaltern actors are no longer beholden to dominant ‘common sense’ narratives promoted 
in civil society by transnationally-oriented elites as the Revolution has opened new 
spaces to contest this common sense. Likewise, regionally, the growing pan-Latin 
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American auto-estima has had a similar effect, with Latin American states following a 
more autonomous relationship with Washington.  
 
Before beginning the discussion we wish to clarify two issues. First, we are not assessing 
Chávez or his project; the three authors have very different appraisals of the government 
and leadership in Venezuela. Where we agree is that there was a definite and consistent 
anti-Chávez media narrative before the October 2012 election. The extent to which this 
effort failed stands as a sign of larger changes in Latin America’s insertion into 
hemispheric and global affairs. Second, our founding assumption is that the Western 
establishment viewed Chávez negatively, as damaging to both Venezuela and regional 
order and stability: Former U.S. President George W. Bush (2010: 358) dubbed Chávez 
an “anti-U.S. dictator”, Barack Obama (2008) labelled Venezuela a “rogue state”, and 
former Secretaries of State and Defence, Condoleezza Rice (2007) and Donald Rumsfeld 
(cited in Jones, 2007), respectively described Chávez’s presidency as “an assault on 
democracy” and likened it to Hitler’s Third Reich. While we lack the space to fully 
document this line of analysis, casual reference to journals such as Foreign Policy, 
Foreign Affairs, The Journal of Democracy or Americas Quarterly provides ample 
academic opinion example. More anecdotally, the authors have had Chávez described to 
them as a “buffoon” by a former senior Mexican foreign affairs official, a figure to be 
marginalised by North American hemispheric delegation advisors and a substantial 
managerial challenge by Mercosur diplomats. Indeed, our title comes from an infamous 
instance of Chávez “management” at the 2007 Iberoamerican Summit when Spanish 
King Juan Carlos quipped to the Venezuelan president “por qué no te callas [why don’t 
you shut up]?” The authors feel comfortable claiming that the Western establishment 
wanted Chávez to “shut up”, long wanted him out of office, and certainly wanted him to 
lose the 2012 election. 
 
Manufacturing Results 
The affinity between the State and the media has long been established. Several scholars 
have challenged the centrality of the media to the democratic process, acting as caretaker 
of the public interest and/or regulator of State power. Far from a “fourth estate”, or as 
fulcrum between the State and its citizenry, the media for Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer (1972) is founded on mass deception. The “culture industry” – of which the 
news media functions as an integral component – does not hold power to account, but 
allows the dominant system to reproduce itself as the citizenry become oblivious to their 
“real” social, political, and/or economic interests. Characteristics of monopoly, mass 
production and technology thus result in not only an increasingly homogenized message 
of reproduction, but also calls forth a passive audience inculcated into this very system. 
Herbert Marcuse (1964), while less explicitly concerned with the culture industry, 
explored these ideological structures to suggest the media was ultimately a mechanism of 
social control to ensure cohesion. The viewing public became “administered individuals” 
both manipulated and indoctrinated into a system predicated on production and 
consumption. 
 
While many on the left shared this critical view, some were more circumspect over the 
degree of deception and spoke to the dangers of reifying any particular ideology as 
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dominant. Although the diffusion of dominant values and beliefs undoubtedly assists the 
reproduction of society, that this diffusion could be read as an explicit project of the State, 
let alone that it could automatically resonate amongst the citizenry became important 
points of conjecture. Terry Eagleton (1991: 46-8, 128) maintains that there was no 
“seamless monolith of a dominant ideology” devoid of contradictions; ideology is far 
more mixed and even self-contradictory. Moreover, even if such an ideology indeed 
exists, others maintained that it is unwise to assume it could simply cascade down 
through society. As Raymond Williams (1991: 140) asserted, “no dominant social 
order…[or] culture ever in reality includes or exhausts all human practice, human energy 
and human intention.” Thus, although the media is undoubtedly a purveyor of ideas and 
beliefs, this does not mean audiences are consequently inculcated into the values of the 
ruling classes. 
 
Seeking to move beyond a focus on media effect to an analysis of its behaviour – a 
movement integral to our analysis – Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (1988) also 
understand the media as part of an ideological arena for the communication of particular 
messages to the general populace. In examining the mechanics of the media system, 
Herman and Chomsky provide insights not only into the North American media system, 
but also establish links between print journalism – object of our investigation – and State 
and corporate interests. To this extent, our study into the portrayal of the 2012 
presidential election offers insight into the parameters of North American and Western 
European thinking, and more importantly for our purposes, allows an exploration of the 
extent to which this thinking was absorbed and used domestically to bolster opposition to  
Chávez. 
 
Developed through an analysis of newspaper coverage, Chomsky and Herman’s 
‘propaganda model’ reveals how the news passes through five filters, each interacting 
with and reinforcing one another. In practice, this involves the raw material of the news 
passing through these successive filters, “leaving only the cleansed residue fit to print” 
(Herman & Chomsky, 1988: 2). Specifically, these filters concern (1) the capitalist bases 
of the media, including its concentrated ownership and profit orientation; (2) the 
importance of advertising revenues; (3) the provision of news from State and corporate 
sources; (4) criticism of powerful interest groups that disciplines the media; and (5) an 
ideology of anti-communism or dangerous “Other” that limits what can and cannot be 
written on particular issues.  
 
Important here is the State’s capacity to configure debate around particular issues. In this 
setting the spectrum of opinion allowed expression largely conforms to the agendas and 
frames of reference of government officials, with coverage indexed to the dynamics of 
debate at the executive and legislative levels.  Thus, contra the liberal-pluralist standpoint, 
the State holds the media to account and not vice versa. This is not to suggest that the 
propaganda model is somehow premised on a totalitarian politics, but rather that media 
behaviour is configured by the five filters, resulting in consensus (Chomsky, 1989:59, 
149). Accordingly, censorship is better conceived as, 
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self-censorship, by reporters and commentators who adjust to the realities of 
source and organizational media requirements, and by people at higher levels 
within media organizations who are chosen to implement, and have usually 
internalized, the constraints imposed by proprietary and other market and 
government centers of power (Herman & Chomsky, 1988:xii).  
 
Returning to the October 7th poll, we now investigate the international coverage of events 
to demonstrate an affinity – tacit or otherwise – between the hostile, official U.S. view of 
the Chávez administration and its representation in major Western print media. 
 
Making the Pitch 
Early in 2012 Western opinion-makers appeared resigned to another Chávez victory. This 
near-despair began to dissipate after the opposition held a successful presidential primary 
in February, uniting behind a single candidate, Miranda state governor Henrique Capriles 
Radonski. The New York Times quickly boarded the Capriles train, highlighting the sense 
of optimism the opposition candidate brought: “The energy generated by Mr. Capriles is 
evident at his campaign stops, which can seem like a cross between rugby scrum and rock 
star frenzy…Not even the firecrackers thrown at the crowd by menacing Chávez 
supporters on motorcycles could dampen the spirit” (Neuman, 2012:12) Writing in 
Spain’s El País, the influential Miami Herald columnist Andrés Oppenheimer captured 
the changed narrative: “Suddenly Chávez seems vulnerable. Venezuelan political analysts 
are no longer discussing whether he will be in power beyond 2019…but whether he will 
still be president at year’s end” (Oppenheimer, 2012: 2).  
 
Starting from this hopeful position, the Western media constructed a narrative of Chávez 
as a tired, ill politician who had failed to achieve his goals over fourteen years in office. 
The idea unifying these articles in the months before the vote was of a president simply 
mouthing slogans and becoming increasingly Orwellian with declarations that better 
things were coming without specifying when. None of these attempts to reframe 
perceptions of Chávez was direct, but rather a gathering sensation that slowly 
accumulated through the weight of repetition. Three main phases emerged in the news 
coverage, going from a period of reframing the narrative, through a period of establishing 
the possibility of a Capriles victory with a targeted discussion of polling numbers, to a 
final period of maintaining hope of a Chávez defeat, buttressed with reminders of his past 
failures. Throughout these phases four themes  appeared consistently: looming economic 
collapse, a crisis of governance demonstrated by endemic violence and corruption, 
democratic diminution, and hope for a better tomorrow without Chávez. 
 
One central strut of the narrative framing phase asked whether the cancer-stricken 
Chávez would survive the campaign, let alone be healthy enough to rule. The Washington 
Post led with the pointed headline: “Chavez weeps at Mass, asks God, ‘Do not take me 
yet’” (Wallis, 2012: A8). An editorial published a few weeks later developed this theme: 
“Venezuela’s markets are being moved by a strange but powerful force: the absence of 
reliable information about the health of President Hugo Chavez and the growing 
speculation that his condition is rapidly deteriorating” (Washington Post, 2012: A18). 
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While this editorial line would ultimately prove prescient, at the time it set the 
groundwork for penetrating critiques of the country’s government. 
 
The Washington Post used the above editorial to link Chávez’s sickness to the larger 
malaise of presidential misrule afflicting Venezuela. References to governance failures in 
Venezuela were direct: “a country wracked by double-digit inflation, shortages of water, 
power and staple foods, and a dearth of investment – not to mention one of the world’s 
highest murder rates” (Washington Post, 2012a: A18). Emphasis on violence and 
insecurity in The Washington Post reflected coverage from El País, which highlighted 
public insecurity in Caracas. An April 8th OpEd undercut strong poverty reduction 
numbers: “the number of homicides in metropolitan Caracas is one of the highest in the 
Americas” (Goytisolo, 2012: 28). Four days later an article entitled “Violence hits 
diplomats in Venezuela” emphasised that nobody was safe in Caracas and that Chávez’s 
government was failing dramatically to provide public security (Primera, 2012a: 5). 
Subsequent steps by Chávez’s administration to address the violence were dismissed. A 
June 7th article about a ban on private citizen firearm ownership was spun to suggest 
citizens were being deprived of the means of self-protection in the face of deficient 
policing (Primera, 2012b: 5). The Financial Times further developed this theme, 
positioning violence as an electoral issue that could undermine Chávez. It zeroed in on 
accounts blaming Chávez’s brother Adan, the Barinas state governor, for the lawlessness. 
While a riposte from the Chavista camp was prominently included, it was quickly 
followed by a recitation of murder and violent crime statistics and an analysis linking 
Chávez’s support to persistent poverty and the politicisation of social programs (Mander, 
2012a: 6). 
 
As the election drew closer, discussion of violence and criminality in Venezuela was 
joined by the themes of corruption and economic mismanagement. An end of August 
Financial Times report delved into the emergence of the ““boligarch”…a new breed of 
business magnates that are said to enjoy close relations with Mr Chavez’s “Bolivarian” 
government” (Mander, 2012b:8). Specific mention was made of funds Chávez was 
sending abroad and how an elite around the president was siphoning off the country’s 
petro-bonanza. Interestingly, the argument the Financial Times built through subsequent 
stories was not one of personal corruption, but rather of massive economic and 
governance mismanagement by Chávez that was squandering a unique national 
development opportunity. The August 25th Amuay refinery explosion dramatically fed 
this argument; the Financial Times all-but attributed the disaster to presidential 
mismanagement and politicised administrative incompetence that had gutted state oil 
company PdVSA’s capacity to not only operate safely, but also continue producing oil to 
fund the Bolivarian Revolution: “A decade ago, PdVSA was considered one of the best 
run oil companies in the Americas. Today, inefficiency and incompetence have led to a 
string of accidents…The company’s annual report admits a lack of funds that has hurt 
maintenance” (Mander 2012c: 9).  
 
Capriles campaign statements reproduced by the Associated Press followed the economic 
mismanagement theme. The wire service repeatedly paraphrased the opposition candidate, 
in one case noting: “he has accused Chavez of lying about the government’s 
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achievements and neglecting the Country’s oil industry, infrastructure and agriculture” 
(Sanchez 2012a). By the end of September more fuel was being thrown on the critical 
economic fire. El País built a story around a Reuters report that the IMF had confirmed 
Chávez was selling Venezuela’s gold reserves. The head of the National Assembly 
Finance Commission was cited as confirming the report, noting the sale was to address a 
shortage of dollars needed to finance the Country’s rising imports (Primera 2012c: 3). 
Just days before the ballot El País expanded the critique, first labelling the Chavista state 
a white elephant dependent upon oil royalties, then noting Venezuela now exported less 
oil than it had fourteen years earlier when Chávez was elected president (Primera & 
Prado 2012:6). On the day before the ballot the Financial Times strongly suggested that 
only Capriles had the credibility necessary to restart the oil industry and hit the 
production targets he shared with Chávez (Blas 2012:23). An El País OpEd by Mario 
Vargas Llosa on election day summarized the Western view with Nobel laureate literary 
allusions redolent of his novels on racism and prejudice to remind Venezuelans that their 
country had “replaced Zimbabwe at last place on the index of liberal economies in the 
world” (Llosa 2012:33). 
 
This trenchant economic critique was paralleled by attacks on Venezuela’s democratic 
credentials and Chávez’s perceived personal role in dismantling representative rule. The 
Financial Times cited a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report that Chavez’s centralised 
personalistic regime was disempowering Venezuelans through “the weakening of 
democratic institutions and human rights guarantees” (Mander, 2012d: 10). Less than a 
week later The Washington Post turned to the HRW report, arguing that the region’s 
“democratically elected authoritarians” do not steal votes, but manipulate political and 
judicial systems to eliminate opposition and dissent (Forero, 2012: A10). Any ambiguity 
in The Washington Post’s stance vanished two days later when an editorial referencing 
HRW concluded: “Mr Chavez certainly has had an impact on democratic freedoms in his 
country and in the hemisphere. While he lives, the United States should be doing what it 
can to preserve and protect Venezuela’s democrats; they will be needed for…a long and 
painful rebuilding process” (Washington Post, 2012b: A20).  
 
Editorials in the Financial Times repeated this dictatorial message several days later, 
citing the diminution of democratic procedures and Chávez’s seizure of broadcast time 
for hours-long discourses: “Although [the broadcasts] likely break electoral rules that 
limit candidates promo spots to three minutes, Mr Chavez says they are part of the 
government’s information strategy” (Financial Times 2012:8). Just days before the ballot 
Enrique Krauze revived this theme in El País, comparing Chávez’s conduct to classic 
Latin American dictators such as Dr José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia y Velasco of 
nineteenth century Paraguay, and turn of the century Venezuelan dictator Juan Vicente 
Gómez.  
 
Assailing Chávez’s democratic credentials allowed the media portrayal to move into its 
second phase of focusing on polling results. While several outlets ran stories highlighting 
methodological issues with the polls – and the so-called “war of the polls” between 
Chávez and Capriles – the issue here is where the stories ran and how discrepancies in 
polling data were handled by editorial boards. The Associated Press was clear there were 
 8 
serious problems with how polling data was compiled which might lead to an artificial 
sense that Capriles was closing the gap and maybe even taking the lead (Sanchez, 2012b). 
But this was a wire story and something apparently taken more as internal newsroom 
background than an item worthy of print. A similar story was drafted for The Wall Street 
Journal, but consigned to its online edition, which shelters behind a pay wall without the 
prominence of being in print (Luhnow, 2012). 
 
Burying stories critically examining polling practices in Venezuela matters for the larger 
agenda of supporting the anti-Chávez campaign because it built credence around pro-
Capriles survey data portraying Chávez as vulnerable. From mid-September there was an 
accelerating rhythm of stories about a surge in Capriles’ support. The Miami Herald 
started an interview with Capriles by acknowledging the Chávez lead, but suggested that 
pro-government support was waning (Wyss, 2012). A few days later Bloomberg was 
more direct, running the headline “Rival tops Hugo Chavez in Venezuela Poll” for a story 
on a Consultores 21 poll rather than results from long-established groups such as 
Datanalisis that showed a strong Chávez lead (Bloomberg, 2012). In the game of 
selective poll citation that emerged attention was given to divergent survey results, but 
emphasis was consistently placed on results showing Capriles ahead or narrowing the gap. 
Polling data diverging from the desired narrative was critiqued as distorted by the “fear 
factor” (Reuters, 2012), not adequately addressing non-declared voter intentions 
(sometimes as high as 15.5 per cent) (Mander, 2012e), part of a process biased by fear of 
a Chávez defeat (Primera, 2012d: 2), or indicative of a trend line in selected polls 
highlighting growing opposition support (Henao, 2012). When polling data failed to 
adequately make the case, some outlets sought guiding commentary from New York-
based financial analysts or outright assertions Capriles was pulling into the lead and 
should win (Minaya & Luhnow, 2012; Investor Daily Business, 2012). 
 
More measured analysis still focused on the possibility of a Capriles victory, but 
modified the message with explicit recognition it was still far from certain (Moya-
Ocampos, 2012). In Venezuela indications were that Capriles was gaining ground, 
making the “undeclared” voters key to victory on election day. This supposed momentum 
pointed towards the third phase of external coverage: maintaining hope and supporting 
undecided Venezuelans in their final push for regime change. 
 
Coverage from El País was most prominent, with a near-daily message of change over 
the last week of the campaign. October started with an OpEd entitled “President 
Capriles?” and an article “The Opposition to Chávez Takes Caracas” (Martínez, 2012; 
Prados & Primera, 2012). Articles with titles like  “The Hope of Venezuela”, “More than 
a vote”, “The tranquil power of the opposition”, and most tellingly, the election-day piece 
by Nobel Laureate Mario Vargas Llosa: “Capriles’ Hour” continued the pressure (Krauze, 
2012b: 33; El Pais, 2012: 32; Primera, 2012e: 5; Llosa, 2012: 33). The tone in all of these 
news, opinion and editorial pieces was consistent, beginning with a reminder of Chávez’s 
failures before highlighting prospects for a new future if Venezuelans followed the 
‘polling trends’ and voted for Capriles. Quiet support for this narrative came from the 
international English-language media, which reiterated the uncertainty of the result and 
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that, as the Financial Times put it, the David of Capriles could reasonably be expected to 
defeat the Goliath Chávez (Mander, 2012f: 6; Mander & Rathbone, 2012: 8). 
 
When read post-facto in a linear fashion Western media coverage suggests a remarkable 
degree of coordination and division of labour. This is more likely reflective of the extent 
to which media outlets read each other’s product and responded to it with renewed 
coverage. The affinity of perspectives on the likelihood of a Capriles victory also points 
to the deeper factors behind Herman and Chomsky’s ‘propaganda model’. Construction 
of a unified vision of Venezuela by otherwise independent media organisations is the 
result not only of the five filters corresponding with corporate interest, but also largely 
parrots – tacitly or otherwise –official debate about Chávez in Washington. Given the low 
regard for Chávez in Washington it is little surprise that narratives of inefficacy, 
negligence and outright authoritarianism resonated within the media. Where the 
propaganda model is less useful, however, is in explaining how this portrayal actually 
works on the ground in helping to secure the necessary electoral outcomes. It is crucial, 
therefore, to shift our attention away from the behaviour of the globalised media to its 
local impact and appropriation by domestic “agents of influence.” 
 
Glocalised Media? 
Clearly the globalised media supported opposition groups in the 2012 Venezuelan 
presidential election. To explore the on-the-ground impact this had in Venezuela, it is 
necessary to move beyond the confines of the propaganda model. While Herman and 
Chomsky demonstrate how large sections of the U.S. media aligned itself with its foreign 
policy positions, less attention is given to how this corresponds with local corporate 
interests. Indeed, building on the above insights, we argue events in Venezuela reveal a 
“feedback loop” wherein local opposition forces and the globalised media interact with 
and reinforce one another in a manner suggestive of William I. Robinson’s work on 
“democracy promotion.”. 
 
For Robinson, democracy promotion has become a central U.S. strategy for upholding its 
hegemonic position over the global South and Latin America in particular. He argues that 
the democracy promoted by Washington is more accurately described as “polyarchy”, 
wherein “a small group actually rules and mass participation in decision-making is 
confined to leadership choice in elections carefully managed by competing elites” 
(Robinson, 1996: 624). In contrast to conceptions of democracy where political power is 
a means of transforming unjust socioeconomic structures and democratising social and 
cultural life, polyarchy explicitly isolates the political from the socio-economic 
(Robinson, 2006: 100). Issues of poverty alleviation are left to an individual’s 
relationship with the market rather than their engagement with the political system. 
Democracy thus becomes part of a wider neoliberal discourse within which 
democratisation is the political corollary to economic liberalisation and 
internationalisation (Gill, Rocamora, & Wilson, 1993). Polyarchy, Robinson contends, is 
the political system of choice because it facilitates the neoliberal world order by 
promoting intra-elite conciliation. Significantly, it also relieves pressure on this elite by 
giving the popular masses a sense of inclusion in a political system that is by definition 
limited. This facilitates consent from below for elite rule, making polyarchy a more 
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durable form of social control than authoritarian models which rely primarily on coercion 
(Robinson, 2006: 100). 
 
Our interest is not in documenting Washington’s promotion of polyarchy, but rather in 
the cultivation of local “agents of influence” and how they fit within the media system. 
The suggestion is that absent a favourable local state, the media system aligns itself with 
what Robinson describes as a transnationally-orientated elite; an elite which shares the 
corporatist vision found in Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model. Indeed, for 
Robinson, a transnationally-orientated elite is not external and/or above civil society but 
operates predominately within it in order to construct consent via ideological co-optation 
and the political incorporation of subaltern classes. Since the 1980s this has resulted in 
U.S. democracy promotion initiatives seeking to actively engage and support 
transnationally-orientated elites in Latin America and elsewhere. The objective is 
creation of “agents of influence” in civil societies who can prevail in social struggles with 
both regressive and radical forces and thus advance a position consistent with the U.S.-
led neoliberal order (Robinson 2006: 106-7).  
 
For Venezuela, this is significant as local agents of influence used the media to further 
their political objectives. The foreign media here is a crucial “external” contributor to the 
polyarchic democracy promotion campaign. The media’s neoliberal worldview and its 
characterisation of Chávez as a dangerous authoritarian acts as a “feedback loop” 
reinforcing the arguments of local agents of influence, fortifying their position in social 
struggles for hegemony. For the local opposition, the media’s portrayal of Venezuela’s 
situation is validated by the fact that it accords with its views, both speaking the same 
language and sharing the same concerns. The result is an echo chamber, creating a 
symbiotic relationship between foreign media and local agents of influence, legitimising 
the position of each to form a ‘common sense’ ideological worldview supportive of the 
neoliberal order and critical of Chavismo.  
 
This relationship was clearly evident during the October election, as Capriles received 
coverage and access to Western media as the preferred candidate. Themes like inefficacy, 
negligence and authoritarianism were recurrent in Capriles’ campaign, while he and 
prominent opposition figures were granted access to international OpEd pages not 
afforded to Chavistas. Closely mirroring media renditions, Capriles described Chávez’s 
presidency as moribund, “out of gasoline”, leaving only the opposition able to promote a 
“better future of progress” (Ellsworth, 2012: A9). Central to this “better future” was the 
overcoming of violence and social division. Committing to the path of “light and not 
darkness, that of love and not hatred”, Capriles promised he would “defeat violence”, in 
victory “burying the period of hatred” (Mander & Rathbone, 2012: 8; Prados & Primera, 
2012). Messages of inefficacy were buttressed by claims of governmental neglect. 
Promising to restore business confidence, Capriles talked of moving beyond ideology to 
better manage the Venezuelan state: “I don’t care about [the colour of] the shirt you want 
to wear, what I care about is progress” (Mander, 2012g: 5). Central to this message was 
the oil sector: “The problem is that [the government] is only bothered with solving 
problems in other countries, it doesn’t care about what happens here” (Mander, 2012c: 9). 
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Contrasting himself with Chávez, Capriles promised better management and that “not a 
single free barrel of oil will leave to other countries” (Mander, 2012b: 8).  
 
Capriles drove these themes home in an OpEd for El País. Promising to re-open the 
country to foreign capital, he committed to “no more expropriation, no more 
confiscation”, adding that he would “restore the confidence…that has been excessively 
abused over the last 14 years”. In place of uncertainty and violence he offered a 
government of transparency, wherein “citizens, institutions, social and economic factors 
all [operate] within clearly established rights and obligations” (Capriles, 2012: 29). His 
privileged access to the international press came in addition to an earlier interview 
conducted with prominent opposition candidate María Corina Machado. In a piece titled 
“Hugo Chávez has destroyed our democratic society”, Machado (2012: 4) spoke of the 
authoritarian tendencies inherent to the Chávez presidency, suggesting that a return to 
democracy depended upon new leadership. 
 
Whether emanating from the international media or from local opposition groups, there 
existed a strong affinity of message. Far from being attributable to one actor or another, 
this anti-Chávez narrative created a feedback loop wherein both the message and the 
messenger became mutually reinforcing, irrespective of geographical locale. With direct 
U.S. influence absent from the corridors the Venezuelan state the media became a crucial 
pillar of the democracy promotion network, and one whose importance is magnified by 
its supposed objectivity and commitment to liberal norms.  
 
 Such a role for the Western media  in electoral contests is nothing remarkable in Latin 
America. By some accounts this strategy has been repeatedly deployed to successfully 
deny electoral victory to candidates considered threats to U.S. interests. What is 
remarkable in the Venezuelan case is that these efforts failed. Arguably, Capriles did 
outperform expectations, but Chávez still comfortably defeated him in the October 7th 
ballot. As the next section sets out, this points to a series of profound changes in both 
Venezuelan politics and inter-American affairs. 
 
What Does the Western Media’s Failure Mean? 
There are a number of implications that can be drawn from the failure of the Western 
media to push electoral results as it once may have done. The first is internal to 
Venezuela. While we disagree in our assessment of Chávez’s government, we do agree 
there was a healthy broadening of political space during his tenure, which has led to a 
more independently minded populace. Even the most vocal of Chávez’s critics concede 
that his presidency has led to the political inclusion of previously marginalised sections 
of society. Whether through attending rallies, marches and protests, or participating in 
elections, referenda and other political activities, large section of the population have 
become politically conscious and mobilised. This is demonstrated in large electoral 
turnouts – as high as 80 per cent in presidential ballots – and some of the highest 
satisfaction rates with democracy in the region. Moreover, mobilisation, has been 
institutionalised through a number of grassroots institutions like the Communal Councils, 
Communes or electoral organisations. Together with the explosion of community media, 
education missions, study groups and online discussion fora like Aporrea, these 
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institutions broaden the Country’s political space, providing previously marginalised 
voices platforms from which to contribute to public discourse.  
 
Understood in Robinson’s Gramscian terms, the Bolivarian Revolution has cultivated 
spaces in Venezuelan civil society where formerly excluded social forces can interact and 
wage social and ideological struggles against the transnationally-oriented elites. These 
elites, therefore, no longer have a monopoly on the institutions of civil society from 
which to secure consent for the neoliberal order. Instead, they are faced with an organised 
and energised backlash from those wishing to take the Country in a different direction. 
This unquestionably has led to greater polarisation of the country, as neither side retreats 
during these confrontations. This became abundantly clear after the whisker-thin victory 
of Chávez’s anointed successor , Nicolás Maduro, over Capriles in the 14 April 2013 
presidential election. The tense stand off between the two sides crystalized the degree of 
polarisation in political and civil society that continues after Chávez’s death. While the 
resultant conflict has alarmed Venezuela’s neighbours (El Comercio, 2013), it also 
represents the emergence of a more autonomously minded popular consciousness 
resistant to external actors attempting to shape political discourse in the country.  Indeed, 
Maduro’s – albeit narrow – victory, secured in the face of effectively a re-run of the 
October 2012 narrative by the Western media, highlights the potentially enduring nature 
of the changes described here, even with Chávez out of the picture. Thus, while the 
Capriles campaign undoubtedly enjoyed the support of the international media – creating 
a feedback loop which reinforced the Western narrative about Chávez – this loop 
fractured when viewed against local election coverage. To test this proposition, we ran a 
series of Boolean searches on the Factiva media database system as well as Google news 
and newspaper web pages to see to what extent the Western media sources examined in 
this paper were cited within Venezuela as well as the degree to which external stories 
were “re-broken” in Venezuela. The results were exceedingly slim; the only substantive 
instance was a 26 July 2012 Nelson Bocaranda Sardi column in El Universal referring to 
the Washington Post’s article on the Human Rights Watch report. More significantly, we 
found that Western coverage tended to lag behind Venezuelan coverage of the same 
issues. For example, the series of April El País articles on violence in Caracas were 
covered in the Venezuelan press during March (El Universal, 2012a). While the 
Venezuelan press revisited the story in May, it was in the context of Mexican requests for 
security guarantees, not reporting from the Spanish daily (El Universal, 2012b). 
Questions about polling validity followed a similar pattern. Western polling coverage 
started in September, months after the issue had been addressed by Venezuelan 
journalists (Vásquez, 2012; Lepage, 2012; Conde, 2012). Acidic, anti-Chávez OpEds in 
newspapers such as El Pais were not reproduced or referenced in Venezuela. More 
tellingly, some of the same authors wrote equally pointed pieces specifically for 
Venezuelan publications or were interviewed by them, with Enrique Krauze (2012a) 
going so far as to explain why a Mexican would be commenting on a foreign election (El 
Universal, 2012c).  
 
In short, Venezuelans wrote their own commentary and did their own reporting and 
analysis of the election without relying on external validation or guidance for 
presentation of what was an equally pointed, but more nuanced journalistic endeavor than 
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that sketched out in our survey of Western print reporting. The point is that the 
mechanisms of hegemony promotion that enable the transnationally-oriented agents of 
influence and their allies in the international media to monopolize public discourse have 
been undermined, creating a more autonomous civil society not so easily swayed by 
external discourses. This growing autonomy, we believe, is a good thing for the 
Venezuela’s democracy over the long-term. 
 
Although a subject for further research, we suggest that this sense of reclaimed agency is 
in many ways a reflection of wider changes taking place throughout the Americas and not 
unique to Venezuela. The arguments by Herman and Chomsky as well as by Robinson 
are predicated on a clear, hierarchical relationship involving either implicit or explicit 
U.S. domination as a near-permanent fixture in Latin American politics. While this may 
have appeared to be the case historically, the underlying reality has always been that 
direct U.S. power over the region – particularly in the South American countries – has 
been less overwhelming than assumed. Cooperation and assistance from the U.S. has 
mattered, but it has not been the deciding factor in the region’s internal political decisions. 
Ultimately, the decision to topple a democratic government was made by domestic elites 
who would look for benediction from the U.S. to validate their actions, not a deciding 
factor on whether or not they should proceed. In a sense this is what Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso and Enzo Faletto captured in the late 1960s with their presentation of 
transnational capitalist class coalitions, implying that domestic elites were just as 
important as external pressures for the sorts of political and economic decisions 
governing developing countries (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979). Again, it is a feedback loop 
that we see as the principal characteristic of this relationship rather than one of 
unidirectional influence.  
 
In this vein, Robinson (2008) has recently noted that Latin American entrepreneurs and 
firms are increasingly engaging with the international economy on even terms, pointing 
to growth in the size and diversity of the transnational capitalist enclaves in the region 
discussed decades ago by Cardoso and Faletto. In Venezuela the Chavista push for social 
inclusion and endogenous, bottom-up development (ironically driven from the top) fed 
what Brazilian president Lula da Silva called the region’s rising auto-estima (Burges, 
2005: 1133-1151), or growing self-confidence. On a hemispheric level, these same 
processes are most evident in a realignment of economic policy formulation. Countries 
such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru are actively reinterpreting liberal 
economic theory through lenses appropriate to their domestic contexts (Reid, 2007; 
Weitzman, 2012). As Robinson might argue, the core precepts of a liberal world 
economy are being accepted, indicating continued pre-eminence of the hegemony 
constructed by the U.S., but the nature of relational power has changed to allow regional 
countries considerably more policy autonomy and economic independence. The 
neoliberal hegemonic model promoted by the U.S. persists, even as the U.S. itself is no 
longer hegemonic. 
 
In foreign policy terms this relegates the U.S. to being just one option as potentially more 
immediate sub-regional relationships and pan-Southern linkages arise. While space 
considerations preclude a more in-depth analysis of this change, preliminary evidence can 
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be found in the inter-American system where the Bolivarian group of has sought to 
denude the efficacy of the Organisation of American States and its hemispheric justice 
and democracy monitoring systems. Likewise, political disruptions and border 
transgressions such as those seen in Bolivia, Honduras, Paraguay and between Colombia 
and Ecuador have been resolved within Latin America to the active exclusion of the U.S. 
(Legler, 2012; Garcia, 2009-2010; 2013). Further indicators come from the mushrooming 
of regional institutions – i.e., UNASUR, CELAC, BancoSur – which bypass the U.S. and 
confine the regional political and economic agenda setting to the region itself (Chodor, 
2015). As Thomas Legler notes, the nature of inter-American organisations is shifting, 
and the position of the U.S. within them – not to mention its ability to manoeuvre them – 
is eroding to the point of it becoming an increasingly marginal actor (Legler, 2013).  
 
Conclusion 
This article presents two significant conclusions for democracy in Latin America and the 
study of the region’s domestic and foreign affairs. The first is that the “propaganda model” 
of Herman and Chomsky needs to be re-examined to take into account the rise of 
competing agency in Venezuela and the wider impact of dissident voices in the region. 
While the model itself concerns the North American press, its international applicability 
requires that greater attention is given to local, competing factors; a focus that becomes 
all the more important in a country like Venezuela where the media is highly polarised. 
This points to the second element, which is that the traditional leftist view of Latin 
America struggling under the thumb of U.S. hegemony is outmoded and in need of a 
serious rethink. Indeed, we might go so far as to argue that a persistent focus on the need 
to “protect” Latin America from U.S. domination has itself become a pernicious form of 
imperialism that threatens to infantilise actors across the region. If anything, the failure of 
the international media to influence electoral outcomes in Venezuela points to a vibrant 
domestic political awareness capable of filtering competing messages and making its own 
decisions for its own reasons. On a regional level this same phenomenon translates into 
an increasingly plural domestic political debate and a foreign policy ambience in which 
interaction with Washington is better understood on the basis of equality and partnership 
(optimistically) rather than a region subordinate to U.S. domination. 
 
This is not to suggest that traditional concerns about media distortion of political 
outcomes or patterns of economic hegemony have faded away. For example, there is 
ample space for a critical engagement with how state regulation and control of the media 
in Latin America are impacting political outcomes, even if this does currently appear to 
be working against liberal economic hegemonies rather than for them. Venezuela is 
clearly a case study worthy of attention. Likewise, the continued dominance of private 
media conglomerates like Clarín in Argentina or O Globo in Brazil, which often 
monopolise public discourse in the region in favour of corporate interests, suggest that 
the pluralisation of political spaces is still a nascent phenomenon. The point to 
acknowledge, then, is that theory should not be used to predetermine the conclusions, but 
rather it should be deployed as an analytical lens to understand processes and seek real 
avenues of influence and pressure. 
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This brings us to our major conclusion. The failure of the mainstream international media 
to bend the electoral outcome in Venezuela points directly to a forceful expression of 
domestic agency in Latin America. It demonstrates the capacity for countries in the 
region to make their own democratic decisions and reflects broader sub-regional trends to 
collectively manage their relations in the absence of Washington. The most recent 
reminder of this can be seen in the wake of Nicolás Maduro’s election as Chávez’s 
successor in the April 2013. At the time of writing – August 2014 – the U.S. remains the 
only Country in the hemisphere that refuses to recognise Maduro as the legitimate 
president of the country. Meanwhile, the rest of the region has moved on, with Buenos 
Aires, Brasília and Montevideo welcoming Maduro on a regional tour and Venezuela 
taking over the rotating presidency of Mercosur in June 2013, and hosting the 
organization’s annual summit in July 2014. For the analyst or scholar this means that 
research has just become significantly more difficult, with the particularities of each 
country and the details of longer-running patterns of sub-regional foreign relations now 
crucial to understanding an increasingly complex region. Demonstrative of this 
complexity is that the lines of transnational capitalist class linkages are no longer 
reducible to a unidirectional U.S.-Latin America flow. Rather, intra-national, intra-
regional and South-South lines are now in play and potentially more important (and 
difficult) to chart. Perhaps most significant, however, is that the passive acceptance of 
U.S. pressures in South America is gone and active engagement and modification by the 
South appears to be the pattern of the future. 
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1 We focus on print media due to its continued agenda-setting capacity for national and international news 
cycles. For example, see (Golan 2006). 
